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ABSTRACT
Thecurrent debate in Western Europe centers on the
relationship between economic and political integration. To
address this problem, we construct a simple generalequilibrium
model in which the returns to trading are directly affectedby
the availability of a public good. In our model,heterogeneous
agents choose both a club and a market to belong to. In the
club, agents vote over the public good, are taxed to finance this
good, and receive access to it when they trade. In the market,
they are randomly matched with a partner. If a match occurs
between traders of different clubs, they both suffera
transactions cost.
We show that, in general, the political boundaries
established by the clubs can be distinct from marketborders,
leading to international trade between members of different
clubs. Further, as the region develops, markets become wider
(eventauily leading to a common market) and the desire to avoid
transaction costs initially leads to political unification. At
still higher levels of development, however, where transaction
costs are less important, traders prefer the diversity offeredby
multiple clubs.
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Section1: Introduction
Modern political economy uses a common framework to study economic andpolitical
systems, and emphasizes that one must understand both economic and political institutions
to develop a successful theory of history (North (1979)). The debateover the formation of
a European common market by 1992 clearly corroborates this view. There is little doubt
that both the initial pressures towards accelerating economic integration, andmore recent
developments, emerged from a powerful alliance of economic and political motivations. In-
deed the very scope of the economic changes considered has becomeincreasingly entangled
in political discussions, as countries express fears that economic integrationmight substan-
tially infringe upon national sovereignty. Fundamentally, the discussion in the European
Community is shaped by the belief that the creation of an integrated economic unitmust
eventually be accompanied by political unification. Investigating the validity of this belief
is the central issue we address in this paper.
The belief that political unification must accompany economicintegration is sup-
ported by two commonly held views. The first is that there are specific institutions which
are uniformly "better" than others: they are more efficient in economic terms, and arepre-
ferred by all voters. One example is the Bundesbank (the German CentralBank), which
is considered a preferred monetary institution. By eliminating barriers betweencountries,
these better institutions will gradually permeate all of Europe. eitherthrough the forces
of economic competition, or through migration of individuals and firms. The second view
stresses that transaction costs are an inevitable source of economic losses when exchange
occurs between traders belonging to different institutions; this view interprets transac-
tion costs very broadly as including problem caused by different currencies, differentlegal
systems, and even different languages. According to this view, as the volume of trade
rises, more resources are wasted on transaction costs, and the pressure towards unification
increases.
The model we construct in this paper is inspired by the latter view, andradically
departs from the idea that economic integration should necessarily lead to unanimity in
preferences over political institutions. We study a system of markets and political juris-
dictions in which heterogeneity is maintained as markets become larger. The fundamental
tension in the model is between transaction costs in a world of increasing trade, and diver-
sification in political jurisdictions as a tool to accoinodate heterogeneous preferencesover
public goods. Our results suggest that as markets become more integrated the trade —offC'ubs and Markets -4
between these two forces will lead to political integration, but onlytemporarily. Eventu-
ally, as a result of the increased profitability of trade in larger markets, transactioncosts
become less important, and a desire for political diversityreemerges.
We believe that our analysis is an initial step in defining more precisely thecurrent
European debate. More generally, this paper is a simple, but formal, general equilibrium
example of the integrated approach to economic and political developments advocated by
North and others.
Our starting point is a microeconoinic specification of the tradingrelationship be-
tween two agents who are matched in a market and form a joint venture. Eachagent is
endowed with one unit of a good whose varieties are distributeduniformly along a line.
When two agents match, their output depends on three factors: the combinedproductiv-
ity of the two agents' endowments, measured by their relative distanceapart on the line:
an exogenous productivity parameter; and the quantity of a trade-enhancing publicgood
which is available to them. In introducing a public good whichdirectly affects trading
productivity, we depart somewhat from the standard literature, which has typically char-
acterized public goods as entering directly into consumption (forexample parks or clean
air), or, less commonly, as entering into production. A primary interpretation of the trade-
enhancing public good is that it refers to legal enforcement; as stressed by Milgrom. North,
and Weingast (1990). Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1990), and Perottiand Modigliani
(1990), a better legal system encourages contracting and investment bymitigating prob-
lems of moral hazard and opportunism. In the next sectionwe discuss this interpretation
more fully, and also suggest a number of alternative kinds of trade-enhancingpublic goods
that are compatible with our formal structure.
Individuals in the society belong to two institutions,a market and a political insti-
tution which we call a "club". The club supplies to itsmembers, and to them alone, the
public good. In each club, the public good is determined by majorityvoting and is financed
by lump sum taxes collected from the members of the club. In themarket, each trader
is matched with a partner randomly chosen fromamong the other individuals who have
joined the same market. If he is matched with a "foreigner", that issomebody belonging
to a different club, the partnership can choose which publicgood to use, but will suffer
fixed transaction costs. Each agent choosesamong the different clubs and the different
markets which form in equilibrium, and neither clubsnor markets are allowed to exclude
anyone.Club5 and Markets - 5
inequilibrium, the size and composition of markets. and the size andcomposition of
clubs, are simultaneously determined. Our objective is tostudy how the provision of the
public good links political boundaries to marketareas, and how this relationship changes
as the region develops.
To achieve this goal, we proceed by stages. First,wecharacterizethe model's equi-
librium when all agents must belong to a single club. Weshow how market structure
evolves in response to the exogenous productivityparameter, moving from multiple, local.
relatively homogeneous trading pools to an integratedcommon market encompassing the
whole spectrum of traders' types. In parallel, thesupply of the public good rises, provid-
ing agents with the necessary institutional basis for profitableexchanges in the steadily
enlarging markets. We also find that the transition towardssuccessively larger markets
always happens "too early" -i.e.at a value of the productivity parameter that is too low.
causing a decline in expected per capita income. Theagents who deviate from their local
market and precipitate the collapse of the previousequilibrium are not representative: in
the new market, the other traders need a muchlarger quantity of the public good, which
they obtain (by voting) at too high a cost. It is only later,at higher productivity levels.
that the wider market comes to be preferred byeverybodv
As a second step, we derive the solution of the model whenagents can not only
choose which market to attend, but also which of two differentclubs to join. We allow
any group of individuals to form a market, but we focus exclusively on equilibria where
each club consists of a connected set of members. Thiscaptures the empirical observation
that the distribution of endowments tends to be relativelymore homogeneous within a
given country than across national borders. We reach two main conclusions in thispart of
the analysis. First, we show that an international marketcan emerge in equilibrium, even
though it involves transaction costs that the agents could easily avoidby either changing
markets or clubs, at zero cost. More precisely, international tradeis defined to be trade
between agents belonging to different clubs andhaving access to different public goods, and
does not necessarily involve systematic differences in endowments,Thus our result is not
related to the traditional "gains from trade" in the internationaltrade literature, but stems
from agents' desire to exploit foreigners' publicgood. Empirical analyses of international
joint ventures would help to confirm the extent to which this effect isimportant empirically.
Second, we study the pattern of migration between clubsas the productivity parameter
rises and markets integrate. As long as productivityremains below a given threshold.Clubs and Markets-6
we find that transaction costs are the crucial factor determining the division between the
two clubs. As markets integrate, more and more traders migrate towards one of the two
clubs, thereby reducing their probability of being matched with a foreigner and incurring
transaction costs. Numerical simulations discussed in the text show that eventually one of
the two clubs disappears, and political union is acheived. However, at higher productivity,
the importance of the fixed transaction costs declines, and even with a common market
agents will again differentiate themselves into separat.e clubs, thereby helping to satisfy
(though only partially) the heterogeneity in their preferences over the public good.
Finally, we compare the equilibria with one and two clubs in terms of an aggregate
measure of welfare (expected income per capita), and of a referendum asking voters to
choose between the two institutional set —ups.Both criteria confirm what the pattern of
migration had lead us to expect. At low productivity, a single club is preferred. At high
productivit. however, the importance of heterogeneity dominates the losses caused by the
transaction costs, and diversification into two clubs is preferred. In addition, we find that
political unification is achieved earlier through voting than through migration. since the
referendum functions as a coordinating device.
Our approach to markets and clubs has its roots in several distinct literatures. The
study of local public goods (Tiebout (1956): see also Bewley (1981)) emphasizes the sorting
of individuals into different political jurisdictions on the basis of preferences forpublic
goods. and argues that by "voting with their feet" citizens promote efficiency in the public
sector. While we borrow from this literature the notion of freely forming political units
which can provide different levels of a public good, we focuson tying this provision directly
to trade. The closest work to ours in the local public goods tradition is probably therecent
contributions by Wilson (1987a, 198Th). Wilson's work is different fromours in three ways:
it relates local public goods to trade indirectly throughgeneral equilibrium price effects.
whereas we are interested in the direct linkage; it assumes perfectlycompetitive markets,
whereas we focus on matching and market extent; and it does not address thesimultaneous
and interrelated development of markets and political jurisdictionsat different productivity
levels, which is our central concern.
In defining the public good as excludable beyond the borders of theclub, we are
clearly borrowing from the public finance literature on clubs (Buchanan (1965):see also
the survey in Scotchmer (1990)). However, byassuming free entry in both clubs and
markets we avoid the problem of the correct pricing of the externalityexisting among theClubs and Markets -
membersof both institutions. This is the problem which is the focusof the literature on
clubs.
In our central question, if not in methodology, weare close to the work of Milgrom,
North, and Weingast (1990), and Greif. Milgrom. andWeingast (1990). These papers
study the form and the evolution of legal enforcement asa necessary precondition for
trade in the middle ages. Contrary tous, however, they focus on private enforcement of
contracts and on the role of reputation, ignoring formal political institutions.In the period
they consider, the Prince did not play a reliable part in legal enforcement.In addition,
they do not analyze the formation of market areas.
Our work also relates to the theory of international trade. Theoriginal pure theory of
trade does not include government, and focusesprimarily on factor mobility and price de-
termination. More recent contributions (see for exampleKrugman (1986) and Staiger and
Tablellini (1987)) do include a government, but thegovernment's role is usually to accom-
plish redistribution (through setting tariffs which alter relativeprices) or to strategically
compete with other governments. Thus the political structure rarely hasa constructive
relationship to economic trade in the sense we have in mind.
Related to international trade theory is the literatureon "economic geography" pio-
neered by von Thunen (1966) and extended by Losch(1954) and Isard (1956). As discussed
by Krugman (1990). this theory is confined to the study of marketformation, usually in a
geographic sense linked to transport costs; it has nogovernment, and therefore no concern
with the relationship between government and marketareas.
Finally, our questions are related to the theory of regionalintegration in political
science (see the collection of papers in Lindberg andScheingold (1971)). More specifically,
the approach we follow, where the question of politicalintegration is linked to the devel-
opment of wider market areas, is reminiscent of the "transactionalist"approach suggested
by Deutsch (1968, 1969). According to Deutsch,agents who engage in increasing numbers
of transactions across national borders developa feeling of empathy towards their trad-
ing partners, and it is this feeling that constitutes the first essential nucleus ofpolitical
transformation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Thenext section sets forth our
assumptions. Section 3 analyzes the model when there is onlyone club. Section 4 presents
the solution with two clubs. Section 5compares the two institutional orders, section 6
concludes, and an appendix contains proofs and a number of additional results.Clubs and Markets-
Section2: Modeling Assumptions
2a: Joint Production
The economy we study consists of a large number of individuals, each of whom
possesses an endowment of one unit. Individuals' endowments differ from one another
in a way which can be formalized by arranging the endowments on a one dimensional
continuum over the interval [—1, 1]. We call this interval the variety space, and note that
it has a total width of two. In all that follows the terminology "individual i" then refers
to the individual possessing endowment x,, —1 ￿ x, S 1.
An individual's endowment is not productive itself; rather it must be matched with
someone else's endowment in a process of joint production. Further. each individual can
form only one match, and each match must be between exactly two (and no more) indi-
viduals.
The matching technology which specifies the output of joint production lies at the
heart of our analysis. When individuals i and j(representingendowments r, and x,)
match, total output is twice
Ix.—x,I(d— x —r,) (1)
where3 is a productivity parameter. and d is the quantity of trade-enhancing public good
available to i and j.Both$andd play a central role in all that follows.
On one level, equation (1) may be viewed as specifying a particular functional form.
which embodies a number of quantitative restrictions. However, it may also be viewed from
a second, more abstract perspective. From this second perspective the equation has two
important features: it represents one example of a general functional relationship involving
the two traders and a third input —thepublic good; and it possesses certain qualitative
features which reflect our perception of the economics of joint ventures.
Figure la displays a number of equation (fl's qualitative and quantitative features.
For a given value of /3d, an individual of variety x, has a pair of ideal trading partners.
each at distance $d/2 from him.' Further, output is linear quadratic around these ideal
partners. Thus if z is matched to a partner whose variety is very similar to his own x,, the
match output is close to zero, reflecting the small gains from trade available. Conversely.
when i matches with a partner whose variety is further away than his ideal type, output
again falls, reflecting the idea that the partners are too dissimilar to be able to successfully
cooperate and prosper; output becomes zero at a distance $d from i (twice the ideal point)Clubs and Markets-9
andthen becomes negative for even more distant varieties. The negative outputmay be
taken to refer to the presence of sunk costs in establishing the relationship (or learning
one's partner's type), which are present in all matches but are normally outweighed by the
match benefits.
The production relationship depends on the quantity of public good. d, in two im-
portant ways. First, notice that i's ideal partner is a function of d; as d increases, i's ideal
partner moves further away from i's own variety z. Second, match output depends on d.
When i is matched with his ideal partner output is equal to /32&/4,increasingquadrati-
cally in d. However, even when i is matched with some other partner, output increases in
d. Both of these points are illustrated in figure lb.
The public good which enters into the matching function may be of a number of
different types, each designed to fulfill a different function in facilitating joint production.
One interpretation is that the public good is legal enforcement of contracts. Thus a higher
level of the public good corresponds to more complete. more accurate (for example, in
determining liability), and faster enforcement. We expect improved enforcement to help
mitigate problems of opportunism, familiar from the work of Williamson (1985) (see also
the volume edited by Mowery (1988)); in turn, a reduced threat of opportunismencourages
investment by both partners, and ultimately increases output.
While the public good may refer to legal enforcement broadly defined, it may also be
more narrowly interpreted as a particular kind of law. A recent paper by Modigliani and
Perotti (1990) emphasizes the importance of a credible and clear legal rule for financial
transactions. They write
Financial transactions are by their nature particularly sensitive to the legal frame-
work in which they take place. Securities are nothing else than contractual legal
claims representing liabilities of juridicial persons. Therefore, their value depends
crucially on the enforcement of their stipulated rights, and more generally on the
safeguards offered by the economic legislation that regulates their issuance, circula-
tion, and participation in income and control.
[p. 12]
To the extent that joint ventures reflect financial exchange or depend on external
finance, these arguments apply.
Alternatively, the public good as legal enforcement might refer to patent protection.
The partners will be more willing to share knowledge (which may in fact be one interpreta-
tion of their different varieties) and invest in research and development to the extent that
their output (a new product) can be fairly divided and not expropriated by others outsideC'ubs and Markets - 10
thematch.
Our model is too simple to incorporate all of the richness of these specific examples.
We note, however, that the interpretation of d as legal enforcement is consistent with our
assumption that the public good is more valuable the more disparate the partners' types:
the more different the partners, the more difficult they will find it to monitor one another's
actions (since these actions are less familiar to them), and therefore the greater potential
role for enforceable legal committments.
A second interpretation of the public good is that it refers to the uniformity of
standards (weights and measures) and regulations, facilitating compatibility of technologies
and communication of corporate cultures" between the two partners. Here we interpret
the partners' varieties as their respective technologies and cultures, and interpret higher
levels of the public good as representing an improvement in the standards quality (reduced
variability) and enhanced dissemination. North (1979) has discussed the role of the state
historically in promulgating standards, and Farrel and Saloner (1986) and Katz and Shapiro
(1985) provide an economic rationale for viewing such standardization as a public good.
Just as with legal enforcement, the standards interpretation suggests that the public good
will be more valuable in production the further apart (and therefore the less immediately
compatible) are i's and j's varieties.
A third and last interpretation of the public good is that it provides insurance. Jack-
son (1989) presents a detailed description of the Japanese Keiretsu, clusters of Japanese
firms which form mutual aid agreements. often centered around a major bank and repre-
sentatives of several key industries. An important function of the keiretsu is to provide
insurance to member firms, both financially and in terms of loyalty to one anothers prod-
ucts. Possessing such insurance encourages the firms to take business risks, increasing
expected output. We believe the keiretsu are a good example of the sort of "clubs" we
describe in this paper, and that insurance can facilitate joint production; however, we
should note that such insurance can also be useful to a single firm producing by itself,
and not just in partnerships —inthis sense insurance as a public good is less connected to
our matching technology than the previous two examples. As with the earlier examples,
this insurance public good is likely to be more valuable the more disparate the partners
varieties: if partners whose varieties are further apart have access to a technology char-
acterized by a higher risk-higher return profile than relatively close partners, improved
insurance coverage will allow them to increase their expected return relatively more.Clubs and Markets- Ii
2b:Clubs, Markets, Taxes, and Trades
Having described the matching function in some detail, we now go on to discuss the
institutional features of our model. Each individual will choose to belong to two types of
institutions: a club, in which he will participate in the vote to choose a level of the public
good, receive that public good, and pay taxes; and a market, in which he will be randomly
matched to a trading partner.
In our model a club's primary function is to provide a public good to its members.
As in the original view of clubs introduced by Buchanan (1965) (see Scotchmer (1990) for
a survey), an individual is entitled to use a club's public good only if he is a member of
the club, or if he can attach himself to a member (we discuss this further below). Further.
we assume that only one or at most two clubs can form, that every individual must belong
to a club, and that all members of a club receive the same level of public good.
When only one club forms, all agents belong to it. However, when two clubs form.
we must determine which individuals belong to which club. In studying this question of
club configuration. we restrict the analysis to the case in which, in equilibrium, each club
consists of a set of connected individuals. That is, two individuals belong to the same club
only if they are connected to one another through a set of other individuals all of whom also
belong to that club. In our simple economy inviduals are arranged along a line segment:
hence a connected club consists of a single subsegment of agents. Since there are two clubs.
they must therefore consist of adjacent line subsegments. As an example, the configuration
[—1, —] and [—i. 1] is a division into two connected clubs, while [—1— }u[.1]and —.J
is not. We believe that the assumption of connectedness captures an important empirical
fact: rarely does a country form consisting of disconnected islands of citizens. In what
follows we show that such a configuration is stable (that is, that a disconnected individual
will not deviate to join a connected club); but we cannot rule out other disconnected
equilibria.
While our "clubs" are motivated by the general literature on club theory, they operate
according to a number of specific rules which are somewhat different than the standard
assumptions of club theory. In Buchanan's orginal work, a club good's availability is
partially reduced by congestion; in this sense, it enjoys characteristics somewhere between
those of purely private and purely public goods. To simplify our analysis. we assume that
our club good suffers from complete congestion (a private good characteristic); that is, as
the number of members in a club rises, expenditures must rise proportionately if a givenC'ubs and Markets - 12
levelof club good is to be maintained. Although this aspect of our club good is similar to
private goods. the good remains shared in the sense that all members of a club enjoy access
to the same good. In terms of the earlier example of legal enforcement, assuming complete
congestion captures the widespread view that law enforcement and a court system become
slower and less effective as the caseload rises.
A second difference between our clubs and traditional club theory is that we assume
the decision over the public good arises from a process of majority voting; this voting
approach to clubs has also been discussed by Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984). Related
to this assumption, we assume that the club is free access —noentry fee is charged; instead,
funds to finance the public good are levied as lump sum taxes on a per capita basis, with
all club members paying the same amount. While we can imagine other ways of organizing
the club, these assumptions best capture the sort of applications we have in mind.
For a given level of per capita taxes t. the amount of public good which a club can
supply to each of its members is given by
d=i° (2)
(Note that equation (2) implicitly incorporates the assumption of complete congestion.)
The parameter a is a productivity parameter measuring the rate at which total tax revenues
can be converted into the public good: a larger a indicates greater productivity.
Each market which forms is a random matching market in the spirit of Diamond
(1982). As with clubs, the markets are free access —noentry fee is charged and no agent
can be excluded from any market. Instead, individuals freely choose which market to attend
based on their expectation of who else will attend that market. When only one market
forms, individuals therefore have no choice and no ability to control who their partner
may turn out to be. When two or more markets form, however, individuals can control
the identity of their prospective partner by choosing their market. We recognize that the
assumption of random matching within a market is strong. If we allowed individuals more
control over their partner's identity, the model would take on a substantially different
character, and might well lead to different results. However, we believe that addressing
that issue would take us too far afield from our main focus on the interaction between
clubs and markets.
When two individuals from different clubs attend the same market and are matched,
several further issues arise. First. we must specify which public good (or what combinationClubs and Markets - 13
ofpublic goods) enters the matching function given in equation (1). In all that follows,
we will suppose that the public good used by the two partners is given by the maximum
of the two public goods available to them. In the context of legal enforcemeit, we believe
this is the best assumption to make: when partners from two different countries (or. in the
world we envision, clubs) form a joint venture, they can usually choose to write the legal
contract under either country's legal system (and in some cases even under a third country's
system). However, in other contexts a different assumption might be more appropriate.
For example, when the public good involves standards and compatibility, it might be better
to use either the average or the minimum of the two public goods in (1). We cannot explore
all of these different possible specifications in one paper. Our purpose here is simply to
point out that many different assumptions about how the two public goods combine are
possible, and. to the extent that the analysis depends on this assumption. it would be
useful to be able to compare their implications.
Second. the traders suffer a transactions cost because they are familiar with different
public good institutions and must expend time and effort exchanging information about one
another's public goods and determining which public good should be used in their trading
relationship. We denote the transactions cost by C;thusin a match between traders of
different clubs, each trader's output is reduced by c. Our specification of transaction costs
assumes that cisconstant across all matches, and does not vary in proportion to the
match output specified in equation (1). A number of our conclusions do depend on this
assumption. and we discuss this further below.
Finally, we assume that in a match between traders of different clubs, the traders
continue to divide the gains from trade equally, just as in the case of domestic trade between
two individuals belonging to the same club. In extensions of the material presented in this
paper, we have explored models in which the traders bargain over this division, with the
trader from the better club earning a larger than 50% share of match output. However, we
have found that introducing such bargaining does not substantially alter the qualitative
features of our results, while considerably complicating the analysis. Hence we have chosen
not to discuss bargaining in this paper.
Section 3: Single Jurisdiction Analysis
We begin our analysis by studying market formation and public good provision whenClubs and Markets - 14
thereis a single political jurisdiction. For convenience, we first reproduce the assumptions
of the model, and briefly discuss the model's structure. The main assumptions are:
1. Varieties x are distributed uniformly over [—1, 1].
2. The output of a match between types .r and x is r —z.,I(/3d
—Ixj — — t.
3. The public good is related to tax receipts by d =E (0, ).
4.The public good d is chosen by majority vote.
5. Traders attending the same market are randomly matched.
6. There is free entry into all markets.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, each agent learns his type (his position
on the line). He then votes for the public good. Once the public good is decided upon. he
chooses which market he wishes to attend, is matched with a partner. and trades.
Each individual must therefore solve two interrelated problems: he must decide how
to vote over different public good alternatives: and must choose which market to enter.
These decisions are interrelated because the public good enters directly into the trading
relationship. so that he will prefer a higher level of the public good the more distant he
expects his partner's type to be from his own type. Hence we must compute a perfect fore-
sight Nash equilibrium in which the level of public good d is chosen with the subsequent
division into markets correctly forecast by all agents.
3a: One Market
The simplest equilibrium arises when all traders participate in a single club and a
single market. Figure 2a illustrates the market and club in this case —bothcoincide with
the variety space. We present this example in some detail, because it is an important
benchmark for comparison with later results, and because it illustrates very clearly a
number of features of the model which continue to characterize the solution of the more
complex cases presented next.
Concepually, the case of a single market and a single club corresponds to the for-
mation of a large common market which coexists with a highly centralized political ju-
risdiction. Thus even though we begin with this scenario, it is most likely to arise, and
most desirable, when productivity (as measured by $)ishigh. and therefore is most closely
associated with late highly advanced stages of development.Clubs and Markets - 15
Whenthere is onlyone market,no single agent can deviate and establish a separate
trading pool. Hence the only decision to be made is the choice of public good by voting.
Each agent knows the extent of the market (the entire variety space) and can directly cal-
culate the distribution of potential partners he faces. He uses this information to compute
his preferences over different levels of d, and to determine his optimal or preferred level of
d, which we denote d' =d(x,)for the agent situated at position x,.
The calculation of d' proceeds in several steps. First, we integrate equation (1 over





The term in parentheses is the expected distance between x, and a random partner. It is
increasing (and convex) in x11:agentsat the two extremes of the line have the highest
potential productivity and the greatest need for the public good. Expected return, as
a function of the agent's type, is therefore concave or convex depending on the public
good provision. If there is a large amount of the public good (,3d> 2), the high expected
distance from a partner which characterizes agents at the two extremes of the market gives
these agents the highest expected return; conversely, if the supply of the public good is
low (3d <2),expected return reaches a maximum at r, =0(figure 2b).
Next we substitute equation (2) into equation (3) and differentiate with respect to
d, to obtain each agents optimal d:
d=[(l+r)]T
(4)
Equation (4) illustrates how the differences in agents' relative positions in the market
translates into differences in demands for the public good.
We note that for each r1thedemand for the public good is well-behaved and single-
peaked around the optimal level in equation (4). Hence we can apply standard median
voter results: the choice of the median voter will be supported by a majority against any
other proposal (Downs (1957)). In our model the median voter is easy to identify. The
preferences over d depend on expecte distance to one's partner. and are convex in z1.
symmetrical around x =0,and attain a maximum at r, =1(figure 2c); the median
voters are those individuals at positions r =+1 —Clubs and Markets -16
Setting i1 equai to the median voter's position in equation (4) gives us the supply of
the public good in equilibrium: -
d'= [JT (5)
Finally, integrating the expected individual returns Ey (equation (3)) over x between —1
and 1, we obtain expected per capita income:
Ey= ($d—1)—t (6)
where t is derived from assumption (3) above.
The model is now completely solved, as a function of the two exogenous parameters
o and $.Giveno, both the supply of the public good and expected per capita income are
increasing in 3 —seefigure 3.
As a final remark. note that because of the curvature in equation (3), the median
voter's choice of d does not maximize expected per capita output. Since the expected
distance from a partner is convex in x, mean expected distance is higher than the expected
distance of the mean agent, and requires a higher level of the public good than the one
preferred by the mean agent. But since the distribution of varieties is symmetric, the mean
and the median voter coincide, and thus the level of public good preferred by the median
voter is too low to maximize expected per capita output. Direct maximization of equation
(6) with respect to d shows that the level of the public good which does maximize expected
output is given by
d* = (7)
which corresponds to the preferences of individuals positioned at .r1 = --/— /T7. lying
to the outside of +1— 1/2.
3b: Multiple Markets
A market consists of a pool of traders who are randomly matched to one another.
While all traders may choose to belong to a single large market, this is not the only possible
configuration. Instead, two or more distinct markets may form. with the interpretation
that traders in each market are randomly matched amongst themselves but will not meet
anybody from a different market. Since the distance of an individua's ideal partner in-
creases with 3. we expect that multiple markets will from when 3 is small, and that aClubn and Market5 - 17
smaller3 will be associated with more markets. In this subsection we make this claim
precise: throughout, we continue to assume that all traders belong to a single club which
provides a common public good to all.
The major difficulty in characterizing the equilibrium with multiple markets lies in
determining the composition of the various trading pools. It might seem that almost any
configuration could be an equilibrium, with traders belonging to the same market coming
from any possible number of segments of the variety space. However, this is not so, as the
following proposition demonstrates:
Proposition 1: If there is only one political jurisdiction, there is a unique equi-
librium configuration allowing multiple markets. This configuration consists of n
identical segments of adjacent traders forming n segregated markets, and is an equi-
librium if and only if 3d ￿ .(n >1).(Proof in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1 establishes three points. First, it is not possible to sustain an equilib-
rium where agents belonging to non-adjacent segments all participate in the same market.
Intuitively, if the public good is large enough to support trade between non-adjacent seg-
ments, the agents in the middle will always want to join the same market. Since we assume
free entry. they cannot be excluded. Second. all trading pools must have identical width.
And third, the number of possible poois is negatively correlated with 3. verifying the intu-
ition mentioned above. These last two features follow directly from the requirement that.
in equilibrium, the temptation to deviate to a different market must be exactly zero for
the trader at the border between two markets (the marginal trader). and negative for all
others. Given the public good and the choice of market, each agent's expected output de-
pends only on his expected distance from a random partner. It follows that if the marginal
traders are indifferent and all trading pools are formed by contiguous segments, all pools
must have identical width. In addition, since the temptation to deviate is highest for the
marginal traders (because they are just indifferent between deviating and not), it must be
that the public good is too low to support transactions with a higher expected distance
than the one characterizing each market. In other words, in equilibrium expected output
within each market falls as a trader's expected distance from his market's center increases.
and is a minimum for the marginal trader. As it turns out. this last condition is equivalent
to the requirement that 3d : we discuss this further below.
The configuration specified in proposition 1 is intuitively pleasing. When the public
good available is scarce, traders tend to remain in "neighborhood" markets, where theClubs and Markets -
distancefrom an expected partner is low, but so is potential productivity. When the
public good is more abundant, traders venture into wider markets (n must fall, and thus
the size of each market must increase, as $d increases above the market n threshold ),
andpotential productivity is higher.
With n identical adjacent markets, the left-most pool of traders consists of types
[—1, (—1 + i.)],thenext of types [(—1 + ),(—1+ k)],andso on. This configuration is
displayed in figure 4. Note that all markets are equivalent, since each trader's output from
a match depends only on the relative distance between him and his partner (hence, for
example, match (—1,—i) is fully equivalent to match (—i.))• Thuswe can compute
expected output and preferences over the public good restricting attention to only one of
the markets. For convenience, relabel the coordinates of this market so that it extends
over (—i.)•Recomputing the integral in equation (3), we obtain:
Ey1 =[l+(nzi)2j_x
— —t (8)
As anticipated, expected output is concave in x, and reaches a minimum at x1 =+1 —
(themarginal trader) when fid <
The computation of d for n markets becomes simple once it is recognized that a
trader's preferences over d depend only on his relative position in the market he attends.
Hence the median voters are now located at relative positions +1—ineach market.
From equation (8). it follows that such traders' most preferred d is
d= [3Jr (9)
The d associated with n markets is a factor lower than that associated with one
market —thesmaller width of each market reduces the demand for the public good.
Finally, expected per capita income is given by
Ey =-($d — — (10)
Notice that while i3d* cannot be larger than ,norestriction is placed on how small $d
may be. Thus, for any c, multiple equilibria exist for most (smaller) values of 3. In
particular, one market is feasible for all ,3For3 less than some 3aZ,twomarkets are
also feasible: whether one or two markets form then depends on traders' beliefs. Figure 5
illustrates the various possible equilibria over the range 8 ￿ 1. for a =Clubs and Markets 19
Althougha variety of market regimes may be possible for any particular ji, these
regimes differ in terms of the level of d and, more importantly, expected output. Figure
6 compares the one market and two market cases. Expected output per capita is higher
in the two market case, whenever both regimes are feasible. Conversely, d is lower in the
two market configuration. These findings are in fact quite general: comparing equations
(5) and (9), and equations (6) and (10). one can show that whenever a number of different
market regimes are feasible, they may be ranked in terms of d (with the higher nproviding
a lower d than any lower n) and expected output per capita (with the higher n providing
a higher expected output).
To understand this result requires re-examining the conditions under which n markets
are an equilibrium: For simplicity, we continue to focus on a comparison of two markets
to one market. Two markets fail to be an equilibrium when 3 rises sufficiently high that
some trader has an incentive to deviate and jump from his "home" market to the other
market. The trader residing exactly on the border between the two markets (at zero) is
always indifferent between them. since they are identical from his viewpoint. It is the
varieties immediately next to him, who are "close" to the border. who are most likely
to jump. Further, at the 3 at which these agents first choose to jump and upset the
two market equilibrium the majority of other traders would prefer to remain in the two
distinct markets. For these other individuals, located towards the edges of the variety
space and far from the border between the two markets, traders in the other market, or
in a common market (should that form). are too far away to be preferred partners (given
/3). tjnfortunately. once the border people choose to jump, those next to them also find it
worthwhile to jump, and a cascading process unravels the two market equilibrium, leaving
the single market as the only viable configuration. Figure 7 depicts expected output for
each variety at the level of /3atwhich this unraveling occurs, illustrating the intuitive
argument we have presented.
Thus one interpretation of the finding that two markets give rise to higher expected
output per capita is that they fail to be an equilibrium sooner (at a lower /3 —weuse this
terminology to stress the chronology of development we have in mind) than is desirable.
As figure 6 makes clear, if two markets did remain an equilibrium longer", the expected
output per capita associated with this equilibrium would eventually be overtaken by that
of the one market regime. which rises more rapidly in /3.Overall,market structure is
not optimal. either from the viewpoint of the majority of agents. or the viewpoint ofClubs and Markets - 20
maximizingexpected output.
Section 4: Two Adjacent Jurisdictions
When we extend our analysis to two clubs, we must specify how traders move between
the clubs, and how they combine the two public goods when "international" trade takes
place.
Again, we reproduce here for convenience the assumptions that we add to the struc-
ture of the model:
7. There are no more than two clubs, and they are adjacent to one another.
8. A match between individuals at positions x and x3 produces output Ix— r(8d—
Iz—zj)
—1.if the individuals belong to the same club, and output x —
x3J(3max(d1.d2)—x —z3)--c—t otherwise.
9. There is free migration between clubs.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, each agent learns his type. He then
chooses which club he will join to vote and be taxed. Next he votes for the public good.
Finally, after the public goods have been determined, he chooses which market he wishes
to attend and is matched with a partner.
This scenario differs from the model of section 3 in requiring each individual to choose
both his club and his market (recall that in section 3 there was only 1 club and hence no
choice amongst clubs). A perfect foresight Nash equilibrium must now specify the size
and composition of markets, the size and composition of clubs, and the public goods d7
and d, subject to the requirements that: (i) d and d are indeed the outcomes of the
elections (with each club taking as given the level of d chosen by the other club): (ii) each
agent attends his preferred market (does not wish to deviate to the other market); and
(iii) each agent prefers membership in the club to which he is assigned to membership in
the alternative club.
4a: One Market
Once again, we start from the simplest case —onecommon market -andproceed later
to the more complex analysis of multiple markets. As we will show, two clubs are desirable
in some wa,vs (relative to one club), but not in others. On the positive side, the existenceClubs and Markets - 21
oftwo clubs accomodates, at least in part. the heterogeneity in agents' preferences over
the public good which derives from their differing positions in the market. On the negative
side, the differentiation into two clubs creates transaction costs. The balance between these
two effects determines when two clubs are feasible, and when they are socially desirable.
The first natural candidate for equilibrium is a symmetrical configuration in which
both clubs provide the same amount of the public good. Such a symmetrical outcome
requires that the median voters in the two clubs have identical preferences, and therefore
that the clubs' memberships be mirror images of one another. Hence the only possible
equilibrium partition in this case is a division at zero: if the two clubs provide the same d.
they must have equal size. As it turns out, however, such a configuration is not a viable
equilibrium. Given the other club's choice of'd. it is possible to show that each club's
members strictly prefer to either raise or lower their level of d; hence, in a referendum
between the "symmetrical" d and this alternative "asymmetrical" d, the latter wins. We
conclude that the symmetrical equilibrium is not possible, and do not discuss it further.
The alternative to a symmetrical equilibrium is an asymmetrical equilibrium in which
one of the clubs supplies more of the public good than the other. Intuitively, such a
configuration seems plausible: the club supplying more of the public good holds the promise
of higher expected match output to its members, but at a higher cost in terms of taxes.
It is not immediately clear, however, where the division between two such asymmetrical
clubs will occur: to determine this, we rely on a formal analysis of the model.
Let us name club 2 as the club providing the higher level of the public good, and
a the division between the two clubs. All x1 ￿ a belong to club 2, and all x1 ￿ a to
club 1. Consider the individual at position x in club 2. In all transactions, he will use
d2, and thus his preferences over the public good are identical to those derived under the
assumption of a single club given in equation (4). We know the shape of this function, but
we do not yet know where a is. However, if a is not too large, the agent in the middle
of club 2 (x, = )is the median voter: all voters to his left prefer a higher level of
d2, and all those to his right prefer a lower level. The reason why a cannot be large for
this result is that the demand for the public good by x, =amust be lower than the
demand by .r, = forthe latter to be the median voter. Evaluating the demands of
these two individuals demonstrates that the condition on a is a < .Itturns out that
in equilibrium a is always negative (we verify this below); hence this condition is alwaysClubs and Markets - 22
satisfied.Computing expected output for individuals in club 2 as
(11)
and substituting x =9:!, itfollows that the equilibrium level of d2 is
d;=[(4+(a_1)2)Ji- (12)
Now consider agents in club 1. Withprobability each agent willbe matched with
a partner also from club 1, and will use d1; with probability the agent will meet a
trader from club 2 and gain access to d2. Thus the expected return for agents in club 1 is:
The demand for the public good in club 1 is theni 2 ctji+C 2—
d11=[——(2_r+u)+x1)]t (14,
for the agent positioned at x,. Expression (14) is convex in x1 and symmetrical around




To complete the characterization on equilibrium, we need to determine .Inequi-
librium. no agent can wish to change clubs (the marginal agent at z =ois indifferent).
Consider the individual at position x, in club 2 (z.[—1,}). If he remains in club 2.
the individual's expected return is given by equation (11); if he switches to club 1. simple
calculations show that his expected return will be:




—x) — — — —
2
C(16
The temptation to deviate, T, is the difference between equations (16) and (11):
T =(d1
— d2)[12
— x(1— c')]—(t —t2)— (17)
Expression (17) is increasing in x,; hence if the marginal agent is indifferent, everyone else
will strictly prefer to remain in club 2. The equilibrium condition for a is then simply that
expression (17) equal zero for x =a,or that
—d2)(1—a)2— (t1 — t2) —ac=0 (18)Clnbn and Markets - 23
(Thiscondition is identical if the temptation to deviate is approached from the point of
view of individuals in club 1 deviating to club 2.) Note that if we substitute in equation
(18) the solutions for d11d2, and t1,t2, we find that for given ,adepends only on the
quantity —.Thus,at higher /3 the larger public good d2becomesmore attractive.
but this effect is exactly offset by the higher taxes required to finance it. In this simple
model. the two opposite forces offset each other, and the parameter /3 enters with the
same exponent in the two first terms of equation (18). If transaction costs were zero, or if
they were proportional to income, with no fixed term, the border between the two clubs
would not be sensitive to changes in /3. It is the decline in the relative importance of cat
higher income levels, precisely captured by the ratio .thatdetermines the equilibrium
division between the two political jurisdictions. This result carries over to the discussion
of multiple markets.
In conclusion, the asymmetrical equilibrium is characterized by equations (11). (12).
(13). (15). and (18), determining expected returns for all agents, the levels of the two
public goods, and the partition into two clubs.
As the equilibrium conditions described above cannot be readily solved analytically.
we have explored the properties of this model through numerical simulations. In all cases
we have found that the equilibrium is valid: i.e.. deviations by either club are unprofitable.
Thus we have concluded that, over the range of parameter values we have explored, the
modeFs solution does conform to the program outlined above.
Figure 8 illustrates the partition between the two clubs for different values of /3,at
the representative values o = and c =.05.Two results are clearly visible from this
figure. First. for 3belowa threshold 3mIn,twoclubs are not feasible. Second. as 3rises.
the fraction of the population in the high public good club rises, and, as /3becomesvery
large. a approaches an asymptotic value strictlyabove —1; thus, for high enough
values of /3,thepopulation in the high public good club tends to stabilize.
The intuition for these results is quite simple. The desire to belong to the high public
good club is highest at the very edge of the variety space, where the expected distance
of an agent's trading partner is largest. However, if 3 is too low, the desire to belong to
such a high public good club is more than offset by the transaction costs which accompany
a division into two clubs. As /3rises,transaction costs become less important. and more
agents join the high public good club. However, agents in the middle of the variety space
never wish to join this club, since their need for the public good is too low to justifyClubs and Marke%s-24
thehigher tax levy. As we mentioned above, it can be proved analytically that with our
specification willalways be negative, implying that less than half of the population
will ever belong to the high public good club.
Our requirement that the clubs be adjacent limits traders' ability to sort themselves
according to their preferences over the public good. Still, the analysis does capture the
intuition that as trade volumes increase and markets integrate there is no reason to expect
the heterogeneity in traders preferences over the public good to disappear. The two clubs
that are created (endogenously) in equilibrium are the tool (albeit imperfect) with which
traders try to differentiate themselves. The fact that the two clubs do not merge into a
single club as $risessuggests that the two clubs might be preferrable to a unique club, a
question to which we return in section 5.
4b: Two Markets
With more than one market, the partition into different clubs and the configuration
of market trading pools are determined simultaneously. The model becomes much richer,
and allows us to raise new questions about the relationship between club membership and
market configuration. We can now study whether the movement to economic integration
will be accompanied by tendencies towards political unification. More generally. we can
investigate whether the club and the market will normally coincide, or whether Interna-
tional' trade between different political jurisdictions will emerge in equilibrium. We will
say that a market is International" if individuals from both clubs enter the market to
trade; a market is "domestic" if it consists entirely of traders from a single club.
Once again, we must start our analysis by identifying how the two markets can form
in equilibrium:
Proposition 2: If there are two adjacent political jurisdictions, in equilibrium two
separate markets can exist if and only if each market is formed by a segment of
adjacent traders.
Proposition 2 is an extension of proposition 1 and is based on the same intuition; we
omit its proof, which can easily be obtained by adapting the proof of proposition 1.
If each market can be formed only by adjacent traders, three configurations are
possible, depicted in figure 9. In the first configuration, the club and the market coincide.
This is a symmetrical equilibrium with no international trade, where the two jurisdictionsClubs and Markets - 25
(andthe two markets) are identical. The division into two clubs is irrelevant in this case.
and the equilibrium exactly reproduces the one club equilibrium discussed earlier. The
other two configurations are asymmetrical, with one club providing a higher level of the
public good than the other. In these cases the borders of the clubs and the borders of the
markets do not coincide, and there is international trade. In one of these two configurations
the international market consists of all traders in the low public good club and a subset
of the traders belonging to the high public good club; the domestic market then consists
of the remaining members of the high public good club. In the other configuration. just
the opposite is true. Letting 'y represent the border between the two markets, the first
configuration corresponds to or >. andthe second to >
The first equilibrium described above, the symmetrical case. is clearly feasible. Since
the two clubs (and markets) are identical, there is no temptation to migrate or to change
markets, as long as 3dissufficiently low. Since jumping to the other market implies trading
with people from a different club, transaction costs insure that the equilibrium with two
markets can be sustained longer —i.e.at higher 3— thanit could be previously in the case
of a single club. Given our earlier results that the transition to one market happens tOo
early", this implies that the transition to one common market will take place "later" and
with a smaller drop in expected per capita income.
The two asymmetrical equilibria are more surprising and more complex. Agents
enjoy completely free entry into both markets and clubs: still they choose to engage in
international trade and incur the transaction costs that this entails. Intuitively, the desire
to engage in such international trade arises from two effects: on the one hand, an individual
may prefer the distribution of potential partners in the international market; and on the
other hand, the individual has the opportunity to gain access to the foreign public good.
In this section we analyze in detail the asymmetrical equilibrium with a > (the
case represented in the middle of figure 9): the other asymmetrical equilibrium is discussed
in the appendix.
As before, let club 2 be the high public good club with jurisdiction over all agents
between —1 and or: club 1 then consists of all agents between or and 1. The two markets
comprise the intervals [—1. -]arid[.1).If or > ,theinternational market consists of
two groups: members of club 2 positioned between -anda. and all members of club 1.
To verify the conditions under which this configuration can be an equilibrium, we follow
the usual procedured: we guess that the equilibrium has this configuration and derive theClubs and Markets - 26
equationsthat must be satisfied if noone is to deviate.
Consider z, E i.e. z, belonging to club 2 and attending the international
market. In all transactions this agent uses d2 (since he belongs to club 2 and d2 >d1).
Since his partner is chosen randomly in the interval [.1],his expected return is
(19)
where is the expected transaction cost from trading with a partner in club 1.
Let us first verify that x will not want to change clubs. If he switched to club 1.
with probability fhewould be matched with someone from club 1, would only have
access to d1, but would not suffer any transactions cost. With probability 9hewould
be matched with someone from club 2. and would use d2 and pay the transactions cost.







(a .—-',)cJ .—t1 (20)
where is the normalizing factor.
Solving the integrals in equation (20). and subtracting equation (19). we derive the
temptation T to switch to club 1:
(21)
T is monotonically increasing in x: therefore if the individual on the border between the
two clubs, at position a, is indifferent between them, nobody else in the interval [y, a] will
want to deviate. Hence equilibrium requires only that T equal zero, or
—a)2(di — d2)+ (t2— t1)(1—) +c(1 —2a+ )= 0 (22)
Equation (22) defines a. The condition would be identical if we had derived it from the
point of view of the agents in club 1. who reside between a and i.5 In addition we must
verify that in equilibrium no —onein club 2 in the interval [—1,-p] wants to migrate to
club 1. This requires
t2tJ <c (23)Clubs and ..Iarke - 27
Tocharacterize the border between the two markets, -.weapply the same logic.
If z, wereto jump to the club 2 domestic market, his partner would be chosen
randomly in the interval [—1, c. the public good used in trading would always be d2, and
there would be no transaction costs. His expected return would thus be:
1 1-i-- 2_____ 8d2[x, +2 —
3(1+
—:1(1—.)— (24)
Subtracting equation (19) from (23) we obtain the temptation Tm to switch markets as
f3d2 2 2 1—a Tm[2XXj]+y2Xj+ c (25) 1— 3
In equilibrium Tm must satisfy two requirements. First, it must reach a maximum at
=:this is equivalent to
3d2 ￿ 1 (26)
Second. Tm must equal zero at x =, whichis equivalent to
3d2-—y+ =0 (27)
Equation (26) restricts the range of 8 values that can support this equilibrium.6 Equation
(27) defines the marginal trader y. Again, the two conditions would be identical if we
had derived them from the perspective of .r1[—1. ].i.e.x, lying on the left side of the
markets border.
In addition, there must be no deviation to the domestic market in club 2 by any
trader in club 1, i.e. by any x,[c 1]. This requires
<0 (28)
The final step in verifying the equilibrium is to solve for the median voters' choices
of the two public goods. Let us first consider club 1. All agents in club 1 take part in
the international market. Hence each of them has probability ofbeing matched with
someone from club 1, and probability ofbeing matched with someone from club 2.
It is then straightforward to calculate expected returns, and to derive individual demands
for the public good d1 as a function of each agent's location:
a32l+o.2
d'j= [1—(x+
2 + o)x1)} (29)Clubs and Markets -
Thisfunction is convex in xandsymmetricarounda minimum at z =1.The two
medianvoters are=and z =1j1,and the outcome of the vote is
d*_r5$(1')2ir 30' '16(l—y)
Thederivation of the equilibrium choice of the public goodinclub 2ismore complex:
voters belong to two different markets, and their combined preferences do not exhibit
the simple symmetry that allowed us to identify easily the median voters in all previous
examples. From equation (19). we can derive the demand for the public good for .r, E [-v,o']
to be
4= ___(1+—(1+7)z)] (31)
Similarly,we can differentiate expected returns for x1E [—1. -.andobtainthe
demand for the public good amongst those agents who trade in the domestic market:
=o31+2+(17)Z,] (32j
Equation (32) is convex in x reaches its minimum at the midpoint x =1j.andis
symmetricaround this point. Equation (31) is also convex in x,and symmetric around
its minimum, but the minimum is at z=152,which may or may not belong to the
relevantinterval. In other words, while we know theshape of the public good demand for
those agents who enter the domestic market, the demand for the public good amongst club
2 members who enter the international market is more complex: specifically, this second
demand is inonotonically decreasing in .r, if o' < but not otherwise. In addition. the
two functions in (31) and (32) are generally not equal at the border x ='y.which further
complicates the identification of the median voters.
The identity of the median voters will depend on the relative sizes of the two markets
and the two clubs. In broad terms, we can identify two distinct regimes. First, it is possible
that the preferences of most individuals attending one of the markets are strictlylarger
thanthe preferences of individuals attending the other market; in this case, there would
be a single median voter residing in one of the two markets. More interesting is the second
regime, in which demands for the public good are comparable amongst the individuals in
the two markets; in this case, the median voters do not all attendthe same market. In
allthat follows we concentrate on this second regime, which turns out to be the relevantC1ub and Markets - 29
casefor the parameter values which we examine. In general, this regime corresponds to a
situation in which the two markets are of comparable width.
\Vithin this second regime two configurations are possible. The first configuration
arises when a is not ver large relative to q-.Thenthe demand for the public good
near the border of club 2 is not very large, and there are three median voters: two in
the domestic market, denoted positions z1 and z2, and one in the international market,
denoted Z3.Then:, z2. and z3 are defined by the conditions




Eachof these conditions has a simple justification. The first condition reiterates that these
three individuals agree on the optimal level of d2; note, however, that these demands are
given by equation (32) for :9andZ2andby equation (31) for Z3.Thesecond condition
states that these three individuals are the median voters in club 2. with 50% of the members
of the club preferring a higher level of the public good than they do. Finally, the third
condition exploits the symmetry of equation (32) to fix the relative positions of z9 and z.
The configuration described in conditions (33) is valid as long as the level of public good
so determined is above what would be chosen by x =a.the marginal member of club 2
in the international market.
In the second configuration a is large relative to andconditions (33) are not







(4) —Z3 = :4 —
Thesymmetry of equation (31) guarantees that Z3 and :4mustlie at the same distance
from x = theminimum of the function —thisis the content of condition (4).7C'ubs and Markets-30
Theequilibrium is now completely characterized. It is defined by equations (22),
(26). (27), (30). (31), (32), and one of the two alternative sets of conditions (33) and (34).
These equations determine the border between the clubs o', the border between the markets
y, the acceptable range of i3,andthe public goods dandd. In addition, equations (23)
and (28) must be satisfied.
To characterize these equilibrium conditions we have relied on extensive numerical
simuiations of the model. Figure 10 depicts a set of results from these simulations; in the
figure. u and careset at the representative values and .05, while $isallowed to vary
from .5 to 1.25.
Figure 10 illustrates several qualitative features of the model's solution. First, the
international market is always smaller than the domestic market, but as 3 increases the
two markets approach equal size. Second. as 3 increases agents move into the high public
good club, until, at high enough 3, the low public good club completely disappears and
we are back to the case of one club and two markets analyzed in section 3.
The results on the location of the markets division are easily explained. The border
trader belongs to club 2 and used d in both markets. Since 3d1. if the international
market were larger than the domestic one, expected returns from trading in it would
necessarily have to be concave in .r1. A smaller market, where the border trader would face
smaller expected distance from his random partner, would then be preferred: the border
trader would shift to the domestic market. Thus the international market cannot be larger.
In addition, when meeting a foreigner in the international market the border trader suffers
transaction costs. Therefore -y = 0 and equal markets cannot be an equilibrium either.
The international market must be smaller, and must be positive, as long as there is any
positive probability of meeting a foreign trader (as long as a < 1). (Of course, the exact
location of the border depends on c.) At higher /3, agents are migrating to club 2, and the
expected transaction costs of the border agent engaged in international trade are lower:
must move towards zero, and reach it exactly when a reaches one.
The migration between the two clubs is determined by the trade —offbetween trans-
action costs, heterogeneity in preferences, and the possibility of free —ridingon the club
providing the higher level of the public good. Consider the temptation to migrate as viewed
by a border agent belonging to club 2, for given 3. If he is very close to the edge of the
market (a close to zero). his relative position dictates a preference for club 2. However, the
international market is dominated by traders from club 1. and the probability of incurringClubs and Markets - 31
transactioncosts is close to 1. If the transaction costs are not negligible, this second effect
dominates the first, and the temptation to deviate to club 1 is positive. Thus a cannot
be close to zero. On the other hand, the argument applied to a border agent belonging
to club 1 shows that a cannot be close to one, if j3 is low and again transaction costs are
important. From his point of view, transaction costs would be too high. Therefore for low
we expect a to be somewhere near the middle of the market. Note that in this relative
position, if transaction costs could be ignored, the border agent should be expected to
prefer a lower public good, and therefore club 1.
At higher j3, the importance of the transaction costs declines, and the preference for
club 1 stemming from the location of the border agent would dominate. This case can
no longer be an equilibrium. Equilibrium requires that club 1 be still smaller, so that
transaction costs again make belonging to the very small club 1 too costly. The process
continues at still higher 3values,until eventually everybody has moved to club 2. and the
partition into two jurisdictions has disappeared.
The results in figure 10 become still more meaningful if they are combined with
the earlier discussion of two clubs and one market (figure 8). Figure 11 describes the
relationship between these two regimes by graphing the size of club 1, as a function of $,
over both regimes. First, consider values of $ for which equilibrium consists of two markets.
Within this range, when 3isrelatively small, agents are content to divide into 2 clubs and
2 markets. However, as 3risesthe productivity benefits of belonging to the high public
good club begin to dominate the tax benefits of belonging to the low public good club, and
club 1 disappears; this is the content of figure 10. Now consider further increases in 3 to
the point at which a single common market emerges. At first. the agents continue to form
only one club. Eventually, however, fi becomes so large that heterogeneity in preferences
over the public good reemerge, leading a second club to form. As 3becomesvery large.
the division between the two clubs approaches an asymptote. This second chronology is
the content of figure S. Figure 11 combines these regimes together. and illustrates how the
second club disappears during the transition to a common market, only to reemerge at a
"later" stage of development.8
We close our discussion of the 2 club —2market case by noting that the qualitative
nature of our results is relatively robust to changes in the parameters o and c.Ofcourse.
the values of these parameters clearly determine the exact position of the boundaries
between markets and clubs. For example. if the transaction costs cwerevery low, theClubs and Markets - 32
economymight settle towards the asymptotic division into two clubs before, and not after,
the transition to a common market. However, the general conclusion we discussed above
would not be affected: it would still be true that with lower productivity and smaller
markets (where there are more than two of them) the transaction costs would play a larger
weight and create pressure towards unification, while at higher ,andlarger markets.
the phenomenom would at a certain point reverse itself. Exactly at what value of 3 this
reversal takes place depends on candc,butit will always happen. In this sense, the
calibration of our model is not important for the result. What is important is the lump
sum nature of the transaction costs, so that their relative magnitude fallswith respect to
income as trade becomes more productive.
Section 5: Comparison Between One and Two Jurisdictions
In the previous discussion, the tendency towards political unification took the form
of continuous migration to one of the two clubs. In this section. we study the question
of political integration from a different perspective: we compare the equilibria with one
and two clubs and ask which one yields the highest expected income per capita, and, most
importantly. which one would be chosen by a majority of the agents in the economy if they
were asked to vote over the two options. The first question is normative in character. In
a model based on heterogeneity, expected per capita income before agents learn their type
seems the appropriate welfare measure (Harsanyi (1955)). The second question is positive.
Measures involving some degree of integration between different jurisdictions are political
decisions, and with a democratic constitution. and ignoring the use of force, we expect
them to be decided by majority rule, after voters learn their type. These positive and
normative questions need not have the same answer, since the voting outcome strongly
depends on distributional issues.
Differences in welfare depend on the equilibrium composition of the markets, and on
the provision of public goods. The first point has been examined above. The second is
described in figure 12, where the supply of public goods is plotted against 3. in both the
one arid two market regions. and for both one and two clubs.
When 3 is lower, and two markets are an equilibrium, the public good voted in club
2 follows very closely the level of public good that would be chosen if there were only one
club. This is surprising, since the two markets have very similar size in the two cases, andCIub and Markets - 33
votersof club 2 expect to use d2 in all transactions. Voters in club 1 only use d1 when
trading with other members of their club. The equilibrium level of d rises for a while
with /3,butthen fal.ls, eventually to zero, as the size of club 1 shrinks and the likelihood
of using d1 falls.9
The differentiation,between the two clubs is more interesting for /3 values that support
the one market equilibrium. Here, the role of the political division in allowing voters to
sort themselves is clear. The two clubs provide public goods that differ substantially from
what would be chosen if there were only one jurisdiction. On the one hand. club 2 is formed
by traders at the very edge of the market, who desire a large amount of the public good.
Voters in club 1, on the other hand, prefer a smaller public good. for two reasons: first,
because of their position near the center of the market: and second. because they can free
ride on club 2. Members of club 1 will use d1 only when matched with someone else from
club 1: and since all club 1 members are relatively close to one another, the need for the
public good in these matches is small. If there were only one public good. a compromise
would have to be struck between the different tastes of club 1 and 2 members. and the
public good provided would be somewhere between d and d.
The total effect of market size, public good provision, and transaction costs on ex-
pected per capita income is depicted in figure 13. Expected per capita income is plotted
against 8. again over both the one and two market ranges, for both one and two clubs.
When two markets and two clubs are an equilibrium, productivity is low and trans-
action costs dominate the outcome. In addition, the two clubs are not very effective in
sorting voters' types. Hence expected income is lower under 2 clubs than with I club,
although the income levels associated with these two regimes approach one another as 3
rises and the smaller club disappears.
In contrast, when two clubs and one market are an equilibrium, productivity is high.
transaction costs become increasingly irrelevant, and the role of the two clubs in sorting
individuals leads to higher expected income under the 2 club regime. The difference in
expected incomes rises with /3. Thus welfare analysis confirms our previous statement
that if wider markets are coupled with higher productivity, and if transaction costs are an
important factor in evaluating the desirability of common institutions, then the importance
of these transaction costs should decline as economic integration is achieved.
To evaluate the outcome of a referendum where voters are asked to choose between
one and two clubs, we need to study how the difference in expected incomesis distributed.Clubs and Markets - 34
Figures14 and 15 show the comparison of expected individual incomes as a function of
agents types.
In figure 14. 3isset equal to 1. and the equilibrium has two markets. It is clear
that a majority of agents in both clubs would vote for political integration. The one club
scenario is preferred by everyone, with the exception of the domestic traders in club 2
who occupy positions close to the border between the two markets. Since with two clubs
the market border is translated (slightly) to the right (y > 0), they are closer to the
middle of the domestic market and better off under 2 clubs. The most ardent supporters
of political integration are the individuals in club 2 positioned near the middle of the
international market. For them. 2 clubs leads to a smaller market, the same level of taxes.
and transaction costs. The members of club 1 prefer integration because it eliminates
transaction costs (though it also results in higher taxes). While the specific distribution
of voters' preferences depends on the value of 3chosen.the os'erall conclusion that one
club will defeat two clubs in a referendum is quite general. Further, this result holds true
regardless of whether one or two clubs is the status quo point.
We conclude the discussion of two markets with two observations. First, voting
reaches the same outcome as a normative decision based on expected per capita income.
Second. a referendum process would result in political unification long before it could be
achieved by the decentralized migration of individuals (compare figure 10 to 14). This is
so even though we assume zero migration costs. This is an implication of the standard
coordination problems with Nash equilibria: all agents in club 1 would be better off if they
could move together, but if the others do not move each single agent (except for a few
border people) prefers to remain. A vote between the two scenarios subjects everybody to
the will of the majority, but is a way of solving the problem of coordination.
In figure 15, 3isset equal to 2. and the equilibrium has one market. Agents in club
1 almost unanimously prefer two clubs. The closer they are to the middle of the market.
the more they benefit from being able to choose a smaller public good, while if they are
near the right-hand edge of the market they value the possibility of free riding on club
2. Only those members of club 1 close to the border with club 2 prefer one club: dis
too low for their tastes and free riding on club 2 is of little use, since their most distant
potential partners are in club 1. A majority of agents in club 2 prefer a common club.
Unless they are extremely productive at the edge of the market). the cost of financing the
public good and the transaction costs are too high to make two clubs worthwhile. OnceClubs and Markets - 35
again, however, note that, if left to their own devices, they would not migrate to club 1;
nor would they vote for a lower level of public good. At higher 3valuestheir preference
for a common club becomes weaker, until eventually a majority prefers two clubs. With
o =andc= .05,however, this does not occur until 3isclose to 4.
Sincemost agents belong to club 1, it is not clear how much power the preferences
of voters in club 2 really exert. If the status quo were two clubs, unification would be
defeated by the majority in club 1. If instead the status quo were one club, a majority of
the voters would vote for a political division, though not a majority of those agents who
would subsequently end up in the smaller club 2.
Section 6:' Conclusions
This paper has studied the contemporaneous formation of markets and political
jurisdictions in a general equilibrium model where the return from private trade depends
on a public good.
We have reached three main results. First of all we have shown that trade between
different jurisdictions can occur in equilibrium, even with free entry in both markets and
clubs, and with transaction costs reducing the return from such International" trade.
When productivity is low, and transaction costs are important. agents enter the interna-
tional market either because their relative position in such a market is advantageous, or
because they hope to free ride on the public good provided abroad. When productivity is
high. a common market is the only equilibrium.
Second. as the relative importance of transaction costs declines, so does their role in
shaping market structure and the composition of political clubs. At low but rising produc-
tivity, agents tend to progressively migrate towards one of the two clubs to mitigate the
weight of the transaction costs. At higher productivity, on the contrary, traders differenti-
ate themselves again on the basis of their different needs for the public good. Since these
changes in productivity are accompanied by a movement to progressive economic integra-
tion, we expect a tendency towards political unity as markets become wider, counteracted
eventually by a movement in the opposite direction.
Finally, this tendency is in line with social welfare. The value of different jurisdictions
in sorting voters with heterogeneous tastes is higher at higher productivity, even if the
volume of trade subject to transaction costs is also higher. If voters were asked to chooseClubs and Markets 36
betweenone or two clubs, one club would be the observed outcome more often than it will
be achieved by migration alone. However, this would again be reversed when productivity
is sufficiently high.
Beside the general structure of the model, and the relationship linking preferences
over the public good to agents' positions in each market, there are two fundamental as-
sumptions that are responsible for our results. First of all, we have modeled agents'
varieties as distributed along a line. This implies that when one common market forms
at high productivity levels, the variance in traders' roles in the market. and thus in their
tastes over the public good. rises. In turn this generates the need for differentiation that
finds expression in the two clubs. If, for example, we had modeled agents' varieties as
distributed around a circle, with one common market each agent would have been identi-
cal to any other, and preferences over the public good would have collapsed to complete
unanimity around a single value, Clearly, one club would have been the final outcome. We
believe that heterogeneity is a more appropriate characterization of traders' preferences.
and that it is likely to increase, and not disappear in a world of wider markets and more
sophisticated and specialized technologies. More generally. it would be useful to extend
the model to two dimensions, which seems a more accurate representation of real world
market and club divisions.
Second. we have assumed that transaction costs are fixed costs. Thus if productivity
and income rise, their relevance tends to fall even if transactions increase. Fixed costs seems
to correctly describe a number of important examples. including learning the functioning
of foreign regulations and laws, standards. currency. or language. However, it is possible
that the nature of our results would change if transaction costs were partly fixed and partly
proportional to trading output.
Assuming that partners can use the best of the two public goods available to them
has biased our results in favor of two clubs, by avoiding the underprovision of public goods
that would take place if neither club completely internalized the markets' needs. However.
we do not think that alternative assumptions would alter our conclusions on the relatively
superior desirability of multiple clubs at higher productivity levels.
Finally and independently of our specific results, we want to stress again the general
motivation behind this model. Its purpose was to provide an example where the structure of
economic transactions and political affiliations is decided simultaneously by heterogeneous
agents, and is liable to evolve as development proceeds.Figure 1
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We first prove that such an equilibrium exists, and then show that it is unique.
(a) Existence. A division in multiple markets is an equilibrium if no trader wants to
enter a different market than he is assigned to. Consider the configuration described in the
proposition. Traders at the border between two markets must, by continuity, be indifferent
between them. Since d is common to all, this condition is satisfied if all segments of
adjacent traders forming separate markets are identical. Traders inside the borders cannot
be indifferent (since their market position is not symmetrical to the position they would
find themselves occupying in any other market) and must strictly prefer their own trading
pool. Consider type x belonging to market [—k.—}, andevaluate a possible jump to
the neighboring market [—h.-]. For.r1, the gain from staying in his local market (the
difference in expected returns) is given by
3dnx2 53d44.r, +33dx+——-—— (Al) 2 2rin n
This expression is convex in x1 and has a minimum at x, =— ifand only if 3d
Thus if this condition is satisfied, the trader at the border z =— isthe one with the
least incentive to stay in the local market. But since he is indifferent, when 3d <no-one
will jump.
Two points are worth noting. The temptation to jump to a neighborhood market
arises at lower levels of d than the temptation to join a market furtheraway. Second.
3d is the condition for concavity in x, of the expected return within each market.
(b) Uniqueness. To prove that this equilibrium is unique, we need to show that the
other possible configurations cannot be sustained. We do this through two lemmas.
Lemma 1: There cannot be an equilibrium where one market is composed of a
segment of adjacent traders but is surrounded on both sides by traders participating in a
second market.
Proof: Consider a scenario where one market is formed by traders belonging to the
interval [—+o, -y--oJ and a second market is formed by traders from [—1, —7+oJU+a, 11.
where <Iand o <1—y. Comparing expected returns, we see that trader x E N+a.1]
will stay in the second market if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
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Ifa ￿ 0, the left-hand-side of equation (A2) is decreasing in x. Since the condition holds
with equality for the border trader x = + a. it must be violated for all z E (-+a, 1].
implying that all traders in this interval will want to join the inner market.
If a <0, exactly the same argument holds for all z E [—1,—- + a). The conclusion
would not be altered if the outer market were to include other non-adjacent segments of
traders.
Lemma 2: There cannot be an equilibrium where two markets are composed of
alternating segments of traders.
Proof: Consider a scenario where one market is formed by traders belonging to
[—1,—a] U [0,aJ and a second is formed by traders from [—a, 0] U[a,1]. where a <1.
Following the usual procedure for comparing expected returns, we can establish that trader
x1[0. a] will not deviate if and only if:
3d[.r + 2x1(1 —2a)]
—2x,(1_202)?0 (.43)
This condition has to hold with equality at the two borders x, =0and r, =a.But since
the left-hand-side of equation (A3) is convex over the entire interval this implies that the
condition must be violated for all z1 E (0. a). implying that all traders in this interval
would want to join the other market. The symmetry imposed in this example simplifies
the notation but is irrelevant to the proof. Again, the conclusion would not be altered
by allowing more than two disjoint segments of traders in each market, and/or a larger
number of markets.
Two Clubs and Two Markets, Equilibrium with -> a
We report here the equations characterizing the asymmetrical equilibrium with two
clubs and two markets, when -> a.In this case, the international market is formed by
all traders belonging to the high public good club, club 2. and by a fraction of the traders
in club 1.
The equilibrium conditions are derived following the same logic described in the
paper for the case a >.
Consideringfirst the determination of the equilibrium border a between the two
clubs, we calculate the temptation to deviate to club 2 for any z in the interval [a. ].
Thistempation T is given by
=81a2 +2—z1(a+)+r](di —d2) +(t2—t1) + (A4)Clubs and Markets - 39
Tis symmetric and convex in x. Thus T = 0 at the border is necessary and sufficient to
guarrantee that no agent will want to change club:
—c)2(d1—d2)+ (t2— t1)(1+ )+c( —2a—1) = 0 (A5)
Equation (A5) defines a'. Again, the condition would be identical if derived from the
viewpoint of agents in club 2 between —1 and a. In addition, we must verify that in
equilibriu.m no-one in club 1 in the interval {.1]wants to migrate to club 2. This requires
—)(d2 —d1)—(t2 —t2)—c<0 (A6)
To characterize the border between the two markets. ,wederive the temptation to switch
from the international to the domestic market for x, E [-.c1:







In equilibrium Tm must reach a maximum at x, = yandbe equal to zero at that point.
The first condition amounts to:
3d2(1+c)+3d1(1—+2)<2(1+-) (.48)
and the second requires
—a2+ 2a —22) — — a2+ 2a + 2)+ (1 +) +c(1 + a) = 0 (A9)
As before, equation (AS restricts the range of 3 values that can support this equilibrium.
while equation (A9) defines the marginal trader y.Thetwo conditions would be identical
if we had derived them from the perspective of x E [.1].
In addition, there must be no deviation to the domestic market in club 1 byany
trader in club 2. This requires
d2 22 1+ac<0
3
for all .r1 E [—1.0'].Clubs and Markets - 40




This function is convex in r1 and symmetric around a minimum at r, = Theidentity




In club 1. the demand for the public good depends on the market voters belong to. If they
belong to the domestic market. .r, E [.1].their preferences are
a3.,i+ d11={(z;+2(1+z)} (.411)





The identification of the median voter is once again not immediate, and depends on the
relative width of the two market areas. In our numerical simulations, however, the only
equilibrium we could find was such that the median voter always belonged to the domestic
market, with all voters in the international market wanting a smaller amount of the public
good. In other words, the mass of traders from club 1 participating in the international
market was always sufficiently small. In this case Xlm = or andd ￿ di(x, =
o'). This second condition states that the identification of the median voter is correct as
long as the public good he prefers is larger than the preferred choice of the trader in the
international market with the highest need for d1, i.e. x, =
The equilibrium is now completely characterized. We have run numerical simula-
tions for several parameter values. With o = and c = .05. we have found that this
configuration can be an equilibrium for 31.6. Within this range, both a and are quite
insensitive to changes in 3. with a always remaining very close to —0.5 and -remaining
just slightly to the left of 0. As 3 rises, a rises from —.51 (for i3 = .1) to —.497 (for 3 = 1.).
and then falls back to .51 (for 3 = 1.6). The market border moves monotonically withClubs and Markets - 41
3.falling from —.019 (for 3 =.1)to —.033 (for 3 =1.6).Thus, the international mar-
ket is again just slightly smaller than the domestic market, and shrinks a little at higher
3. Club 1, the low public good club, is much larger than club 2. with 75% of the total
population belonging to it; further, this division is quite stable in 3. When rises above
1.6, the growth of the domestic market in club 1 is such that d rises above d, and the
equilibrium collapses to the case discussed in the text of the paper (indeed to its mirror
image). But since that configuration could not support an equilibrium with two separate
clubs for 3 ￿ 1.3, it follows that for ￿ 1,6, we can only have a single club. Note that
the two clubs can thus be an equilibrium at higher values of /3 if -> , butthat this does
not alter the need for political unification before one common market can be achieved.
Both expected per capita income and its changes with /3 are remarkably similar to
the values obtained when> -. asdiscussed in the text. Both this measure of welfare.
and direct voting by the agents on the choice between one or two clubs, are similar to the
results presented in the text.Clubs and Markets - 42
Footnotes
This paper was completed while Alessandra Casella was a National Fellow at the Hoover
Institution. We are grateful to George Akerlof, David Baron, Raquel Fernandez, and Barry
Weingast for comments, as well as to seminar participants at the Yale Conference on Fiscal
Aspects of European Integration held during March 1990, the Ohlin Conference on Po-
litical Economy held during June 1990, the Lothian Foundation Conference on European
Currency Union held during September 1990, the YBER 1990 Summer Institute on Inter-
national Economics, the University of California at Berkeley. the University of California
at San Diego, the University of Quebec at Montreal, the Univeristv of Texas at Austin.
and the Hoover Institution.
'Of course, if x is towards the edge of the [—.1, 1 strip and 3d is sufficiently high. one (or
both) of these ideal partners may not exist.
2Note that for very high 8 an agent prefers to be matched with someone at the farthest
edge of the space.
3No markets forming and no trade is also always possible. but of little interest.
41n theory. asymmetrical equilibria with no international trade are also possible: each club
then coincides with a market, but the two clubs (and the two markets) do not have the
same size. and do not provide the same public good. In our model. however, this can arise
only when a is very close to 1/2, and even then the maximum asymmetry that can be
supported is quite small. To be more precise, we have found that the small club must
always be at least 86% of the size of the large club. approaching this limit as a approaches
1/2. Equilibria with international trade where the two clubs provide the same public good
cannot exist, since agents will then all migrate to one club to avoid transaction costs.
5Note that we are using the fact that any single deviation to club 1 would leave the two
public goods unaffected.
6Note that since the two markets have different sizes, equation (25) is not equivalent to
requiring concavity in expected returns. From the viewpoint of a member of club 2, this
would require d2 1— if he belonged to the interval [-i,a]and 3d2 1 if he
belonged to [—1,-)].
7For a small range of 3 values, the two sets of conditions (31) and (32) can both apply.
and two equilibria exist. We will ignore this in what follows, both because the relevant
range of 3 is indeed small, and because this does not affect in any way our conclusions.
We will assume that the median voters are determined by (32) as soon as these conditions
are possible.
8In the other possible scenario with 2 clubs, two markets, and international trade (y >a).
as firisesand economic unification takes place the transition to political unification again
occurs, and the conclusion in the text remains applicable. However, as long as two clubs
are an equilibrium, the border between them remains almost unchanged, with a discrete
jump when 3 reaches a critical threshold value.
9The 'blip" in d and d in correspondence to 3 =1comes from the shift in regime in the
identification of the median voters, from conditions (31) to i32).Clubs and Markets-43
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